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A Reply to Richard Arneson
Burke Hendrixt
Comment on Richard Arneson's Just Warfare Theory
and Noncombatant Immunity
Richard Arneson has raised a challenge to the basic division in tradi-
tional just war theory between combatants and non-combatants, arguing
that in many cases culpable non-combatants should be preferred as targets
to morally innocent combatants. He calls the basic principle at work Fault
Forfeits First-when someone has to be killed in warfare, it is appropriate
that persons who are morally culpable for the conflict be killed before
those who are not. Thus, civilians can often be legitimate targets, either
because they are relatively more morally culpable than the soldiers fighting
on their side or simply because they are an easier and more effective target
in a particular case. In making this kind of argument, Professor Arneson
joins Jeff McMahan and some others who have been challenging the tradi-
tional distinction between combatants and non-combatants and many of
the conclusions of just war theory derived therefrom.
I want to argue that these kinds of revisions of traditional just war
theory are generally misguided because they fail to take sufficient account
of the difficulties of using the theory in practical terms, and the real-world
limitations that face all of us in deciding how to act in complex circum-
stances. Professor Arneson concedes, of course, that it may be reasonable
to uphold the traditional division between combatants and non-combat-
ants as a matter of international law or publicly-promulgated moral stan-
dards, since doing so may produce the best social consequences over the
long term. But he argues that these expectations about social conse-
quences should not blind us to the fundamental difficulties the distinction
faces when investigated on its own terms and within its own logic.
I believe Professor Arneson underestimates the degree to which all
moral principles take their value from the kinds of purposes for which they
must be used. In practical terms, morality is supposed to guide judgment,
and it can only do that if we know what general classes of decisions we are
likely to face. While Professor Arneson cannot escape this sort of limit, he
believes that we must at least begin from a more abstracted position than
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just war theorists usually do and work toward more legalistic or publicly-
usable principles in stages because doing so may sometimes expose sur-
prising exceptions to principles that seem fixed to us. I will argue that
pushing matters into higher levels of abstraction than Professor Arneson
prefers to do actually undermines his argument in fundamental ways and
shows the degree to which all moral theories must be structured at appro-
priate levels for their social purposes. In doing this, I will try to uncover
the dangers of the particular kinds of hypothetical cases that Professor
Arneson seeks to use in eroding the boundary between combatants and
non-combatants.
In traditional just war theory, combatants can be killed because they
are materially and causally involved in attempts to kill others, and not
because of their purported moral culpability. On traditional just war stan-
dards, the opposing party's involvement in the war effort-not his evil char-
acter-makes him a legitimate target. On Professor Arneson's revised
standard, relative moral culpability is what matters instead. Professor
Arneson's central principle is that Fault Forfeits First- whenever someone
must be killed, it is always better that it be the morally culpable person
rather than the morally non-culpable one, whether that person is actively
involved in war-making or not.
Professor Arneson gives us a number of cases in trying to persuade us
of the plausibility of his position. I want to consider in particular the cases
he outlines involving bystanders-people who would generally not be legiti-
mate targets in traditional just war theory. Professor Arneson asks us to
imagine ourselves in three hypothetical cases in which we are driving up a
narrow mountain road, while a person called Evil Aggressor is bearing
down upon us in a heavily armored vehicle with the intention of killing us.
Because of our circumstances, we are incapable of harming Evil Aggressor,
who is causally responsible for the danger to us-we can only choose either
to engage him in car-to-armored-vehicle combat knowing that we will die,
or to swerve off the road in the only spot available for doing so, and
thereby kill a bystander who is in no way causally related to the harm we
face. In ordinary just war theory, self-defense does not justify the killing of
a causally uninvolved person even to save one's own life-soldiers can only
target soldiers and not civilians, even if they know that they will die as a
result of this limitation. Professor Arneson wants to convince us that it
would be right to kill the bystander in saving ourselves if the bystander is
morally culpable in some way. I agree with his judgments as the cases are
framed, but I believe that this framing is radically incomplete.
Professor Arneson gives us three possibilities for what the bystander
alongside the road might be doing as Evil Aggressor bears down upon us.
In each case, the bystander is not an Innocent Bystander but rather a Guilty
Bystander who is to some degree or another culpable. In the first example,
Guilty Bystander is excited to see Evil Aggressor kill us and is trying to
contribute materially to our demise by throwing snowballs at our car.
Since his attempts are so pathetically ineffectual, however, he is not really
any sort of causal threat, and not someone who we could legitimately kill
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to preserve our own lives under traditional just war theory. In the second
case, he does not attempt to causally contribute, but he really wishes that
he could do so-perhaps his arm is broken, which prevents even what
would be his ineffectual attempts at throwing snowballs. The third case is
the most striking, and indeed the most revealing of Professor Arneson's
revised theory-in this case, Guilty Bystander is not actually doing any-
thing, or even wishing he could do something-instead, he is simply excited
to see our death, either because he is a fan of Evil Aggressor or because he
thinks it will be entertaining to watch. In this case, Professor Arneson
argues that the evil desires of the Guilty Bystander are sufficient to render
him liable to harm under the principle he has described as Fault Forfeits
First-the bystander is culpable in his attitudes, and culpable people
should always be killed before non-culpable people. For that reason, we
can run him over to preserve our own lives without compunction-perhaps
he did not "have it coming," but he at least had it coming more than we did.
But here we need to ask some more questions about who Guilty
Bystander really is. Under Professor Arneson's hypothetical, we can see
that Guilty Bystander is culpable in this case, at this moment, and that the
person who would otherwise have to die has done nothing wrong, at this
particular moment. Professor Arneson also acknowledges, however, that it
matters what people might have done in the past to create a contemporary
danger-culpability is more than simply a matter of the present moment.
But if the past matters in important ways, suddenly we need to ask another
set of questions. What should we say if Guilty Bystander, although
exulting in our impending death today, has actually been an exemplary
person for most of his life? Let us assume, for example, that he has been
extremely generous towards others, works exceptionally hard to fulfill his
duties as a husband and father, and works for a very low wage in trying to
prevent animal cruelty. His approval of our impending death in this
instance is admittedly out of character, but all of us have our occasional
failings and hypocrisies, many of them severe. Is it still so obvious that he
is a legitimate target to be killed? At least to me, it no longer is.
But let us thicken our hypothetical case a bit further, and ask another
set of questions about who the driver might really be. Let us assume that
yesterday, in totally different circumstances, our present driver was an Evil
Aggressor. Professor Arneson, in holding that culpability matters only in
regard to the particular situation, narrowly construed, seems committed to
the position that this fact about our driver's recent past cannot make a
difference in the present case. But surely this is wrong, as becomes espe-
cially clear when we make our driver far more culpable-suppose, for
example, that yesterday he killed an entire family in cold blood, simply for
the entertainment value of doing so. If we consider culpability only for the
particular circumstances of Evil Aggressor, Guilty Bystander, and the
driver, we will have to say that Guilty Bystander should be killed rather
than the driver, because the driver's culpability is unrelated to present cir-
cumstances. On any compelling understanding of Fault Forfeits First,
however, this simply will not do-what matters when we are judging rela-
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tive culpability is not simply the present moment narrowly construed, but
the overall degree of aggregated culpability by those involved on each side.
Notice that this aggregation of culpability is not a form of consequen-
tialism, since it does not ask which person is of more value to society-it
asks instead what kind of intentions an individual has had over the course
of his or her lifetime. Moreover, Professor Arneson seems right in holding
that we cannot simply consider directly harmful acts committed by each
party. Culpability as such is a function of our will towards others and not
of our actual ability to harm them. But if this is true, it seems to pose some
daunting difficulties for Fault Forfeits First-how will we ever have the nec-
essary knowledge to evaluate the lives of each person involved?
Moreover, it would not be easy to make these comparisons in any sat-
isfying way even if we had full information about each person's acts and
intentions over the course of his or her life. Even with such information,
we would still need to know how to go about weighing and balancing all of
the disparate acts and intentions involved. Can, for example, virtuous and
selfless acts offset evil intentions? Is a one-time desire for murder inher-
ently worse than a long, drawn-out set of lesser offenses? Are bad inten-
tions fully negated by subsequent contrition, or not at all? Does a victim's
forgiveness dissolve culpability or leave it fully intact? I am not sure how to
give definitive answers to these questions, but in practical terms, we have to
find midrange solutions for dealing with the uncertain culpability and
character of others.
Some readers will probably want to object that I have simply changed
Professor Arneson's hypothetical cases in illegitimate ways by adding in
information about the previous lives of our Guilty Bystander and driver, so
that we are now arguing about something entirely different than what he
had in mind. Clearly, I have added a great deal to his original case, but is
any of it an illegitimate alteration? We should be extremely wary of draw-
ing lessons from hypotheticals that cannot bear additional information
without fracturing. If Fault Forfeits First is to be a principle with real use,
it will have to be viable outside of an extremely sheltered environment in
which our horizons of culpability are artificially confined to one small
moment in time, with all other information defined away as irrelevant.
Once we remove the artificial framework of culpability for a particular cir-
cumstance narrowly construed, it is no longer obvious that civilians who
supported an unjust war must be more culpable on balance than those who
opposed the war, or those who are resisting the unjust war from the other
side.
Why, then, do Professor Arneson's hypothetical cases seem enticing in
the first place? It is because we have learned from criminal law to believe
that culpability should be judged in regard to particular acts narrowly con-
strued. In criminal law, we only make judgments about what people have
done in specific instances because these are the kinds of acts that we can
recognize, that others can recognize, and that we can hope to deter through
punishment. But we should also remember that where the criminal law is
concerned, we have special procedures for attempting to discover the facts
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of the matter-we do not simply act on our impressions about a particular
person but rather spend a great deal of time and energy in determining
guilt or innocence. And despite these procedures, the criminal law remains
an imperfect midrange solution for the problem of human wrongdoing-it
does not ensure that only evil people will be punished, or that all culpable
people will receive what they deserve.
Given these acknowledged limits, it seems both implausible and dan-
gerous to convert a legal idea of culpability for specific, narrowly-defined
acts into a theoretical tool intended to evaluate the principles for combat-
ants in a just war, as Professor Arneson's hypothetical cases encourage us
to do. Once we escape these implausibly narrowed horizons, we cannot
immediately conclude that someone who is culpable for supporting a par-
ticular unjust war is in fact a more legitimate target. Those who support an
unjust war are without doubt culpable in this particular regard, but this
does not necessarily make them on balance responsible for more evil in the
world than someone who opposed this particular war, or a civilian within
the country being attacked.
This should be particularly clear when we consider the centrally
important question of how groups of people in the real world fall into wars.
Even if most wars are unjust, most believe that their individual cause is
legitimate. Sometimes we can write such beliefs off as egregious forms of
self-delusion or ignorance, but it seems both uncharitable to the burdens of
judgment faced by others and factually incorrect to believe that most per-
sons do not generally have more worthy motivations. People who support
a war will often be scared for themselves, their loved ones, and their way of
life; they will believe that they are rescuing people in need; they will believe
that the other party is motivated only by evil; they may even believe that
God desires their involvement. In other words, they will be flawed human
beings with complex motivations, whose culpability in this particular case
will often be embedded in a much larger web of non-culpable or even mor-
ally desirable social practices that have helped to produce this particular
war. To decide who is culpable for more wrongdoing on the whole, we
must look beyond particular instances in time and evaluate the whole of an
individual's existence, which is by no means a straightforward task.
Once we have somehow carried out these full evaluations, it may turn
out that those who are supporting the unjust war still remain relatively
more culpable, or we may find that there are a larger number of culpable
people on the side resisting the unjust war. What we are more likely to
discover, however, is that both populations are more or less the same - a
few people who have been severely malign in their actions and intentions,
alongside many who have more inconsistent motivations, and with a few
true saints thrown in for good measure. Seen in this light, it seems to make
more sense to try to find some more plausible and useful standard than
culpability for deciding who is a legitimate target in warfare-something
more obvious and easily recognized, something that can be used by real
moral actors in dangerous and difficult circumstances, when they will have
to be able to choose among a number of eligible human targets, and where
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they will be too often tempted to attribute evil to those no better or worse
than themselves. The division in traditional just war theory between com-
batants and non-combatants, between those who are contributing materi-
ally to the war and those who are not, seems extremely appropriate as it
takes seriously the kinds of limitations of knowledge and judgment under
which all of us must operate. In other words, the traditional distinction
between combatants and non-combatants deserves to be upheld because it
is a valuable theory of the middle range, adapted to the purposes to which
it must be put.
Before closing, however, I should say that there likely does remain an
important role for culpability within the larger contours of just war theory.
As I noted above, our familiar view of culpability for particular kinds of
limited acts is a legal concept that is fully appropriate for the purposes to
which it is put. For the same reason, judgments about culpability for spe-
cific acts could have an important role to play in structuring the character
of just war theory insofar as it can reasonably aspire to mimic a legal order
in offering inducements for the avoidance of particular kinds of behaviors.
It thus may be reasonable, as a matter of social practice, to portray entire
democratic populations as relevantly culpable if they fail to prevent an
unjust war. More obviously, it seems to make sense to have a social prac-
tice in which we punish people who lead countries into such wars or who
commit criminal acts during the war itself. But we should recognize these
standards for what they are-imperfect, future-oriented social practices
that can only imprecisely distribute rewards and punishments. Indeed,
there is a certain irony here-it is not impossible that Professor Arneson's
arguments could be given a derivative justification within such a practice,
as the set of rules judged to lead to the best outcomes for most people over
the long term. But to argue that they are justified at some more founda-
tional level of moral analysis would ultimately be a mistake -judgments
about culpability and punishment for particular acts are themselves part of
a mid-level moral theory, and not something more fundamental to such a
theory. Midlevel theories, in short, are the things we know how to create
and, therefore, they deserve our continued respect where they are already
working tolerably well. Thus, the traditional distinction between combat-
ants and non-combatants seems to me worth upholding, however enticing
the hypothetical cases that would try to persuade us otherwise.
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